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interested parties." 29 It would seem then that a defendant would
be justified in objecting to service which was not "reasonably
calculated" to reach him but by some quirk of fate managed to come
into his hands. Therefore, any such method should not be condoned
by the courts.
CPLR 308(3): Mailing to "last known residence" not valid where
plaintiff knows that defendant no longer resides theie.
In Zelnick v. Bartlik3 0 service at defendant's "last known
residence" was alleged to be defective on the ground that the
process server was apprised of the fact that the defendant no longer
lived at that address. In fact, the summons was left with the
defendant's wife whom he had abandoned. The court, under these
circumstances, held that the service of process was not "reasonably
calculated to give actual notice" and, hence, was not sufficient to
render the defendant subject to the court's jurisdiction.
The instant case is in accord with Polansky v. Paugh31 and
Jauk v. Mello.3 2 In the Jauk case, mailing and affixing (or delivery)
was to the same address. And while it cannot be ascertained with
any degree of certainty, it appears that such was the case in Polansky.
A different situation is involved, however, where the mailing is to
a "last known residence" which the plaintiff knows is no longer
defendant's residence but the "'affixing" or "delivery" is to a place
where the defendant, in fact, works or dwells. One commentator
would mke the validity of the service last alluded to dependent
upon whether the plaintiff knew, or did not know, that the defendant no longer lived at his "last known residence." 33 This does
not appear entirely logical since what is important is whether the
defendant can reasonably be said to have received actual notice
of the pendency of the action. Although plaintiff may have actual
knowledge that defendant no longer resides at his "last known
residence" service should not be set aside where the "affixing" or
"dalivery" is to a place where defendant in fact lives or works.
In stich a case, it would appear that due process requirements would
be satisfied.
A difficult situation is presented where plaintiff knows that the
defendant no longer lives at his "last known residence," and also
knows the defendant's place of business or abode-but does not
know defendant's present residence. Perhaps plaintiff's best sbFition
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would be to resort to CPLR 308(4). The court, with little difficulty, could direct that the summons be both mailed and afflixed or
delivered to the business address or place of abode.34 There would
appear to be nothing unconstitutional or procedurally incorrect with
such substituted service. Section 308(4), thus far, has not been
utilized to any great extent by the practicing bar. This section
could alleviate many of the problems caused by the requirement of
mailing to a "last known residence." 3r
CPLR 308(3): Where CPLR 313 is inapplicable, "last known
residence" construed to embrace only a residence within
the state.
In Durgom v. Durgom, 38 the defendant was a nonresident
and a non-domiciliary. He did, however, maintain a business office
in New York City. Plaintiff's action was based on an alleged
breach of a separation agreement. Plaintiff alleged that the court
acquired personal jurisdiction over the defendant by virtue of the
fact that service was made upon him pursuant to CPLR 308(3).3
The summons was affixed to the door of defendant's place of business
in New York City and a copy was mailed to his California residence.
Defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint was granted on
the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction over his person. In
reaching its conclusion the court stated that unless CPLR 313 was
applicable, the "last known residence" provision of CPLR 308(3),
which requires a mailing to the "last known residence," necessarily
had to be interpreted as meaning a "last known residence" within
the state.38
In the instant case, there was no substantive basis for in personam or in rem jurisdiction. Breach of a separation agreement
does not give rise to in personam jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary
under CCA § 404 (civil court counterpart of CPLR 302). 39 In
addition, an individual who transacts business in New York is not
subject to in personam jurisdiction under CPLR 302 unless the
cause of action arises out of the business transacted.
As the court noted, there is some authority in support of the
plaintiff's contention that the mere out-of-state mailing to a de34 See Timen v. Robinson, (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), 151 N.Y.L.J.,
April 6, 1964, p. 15, col. 1.
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